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Abstract
Variable real exchange rates influence the country chosen for location of production
facilities by a multinational enterprise. With risk averse investors and fixed productive
factors, a parent company should not be indifferent to the choice of production capacity
location, even when the expected costs of production are identical across countries. If a
non-negative correlation exists between real export demand shocks and real exchange rate
shocks, the multinational will optimally locate some of its productive capacity abroad. The
share of production capacity located abroad increases as exchange rate volatility rises and
also rises as exchange rate and export demand shocks become more correlated. These
results are supported by empirical analysis of quarterly United States bilateral foreign-
direct-investment flows with Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom: exchange rate
variability is associated with a rise in the share of production capacity located offshore.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of exchange-rate variability for domestic and international
investment flows has been argued in numerous contexts. In industrialized economies, the
proported effects of exchange-rate variability have influenced the choice of international
monetary regimes. This issue arose in the early 1970s when the Smithsonian Agreement
was discussed and again at the time of the Plaza Accord during the mid-1980s. In the early
1 990s, the posited negative implications of variable exchange rates was one motivating
theme in designing the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) that aspired to guide currencies
within the European Monetary System, The currency crises within the ERM in September
1992 and Spring 1993 refocused attention on the rationale for limiting exchange rate
movements and on validity of arguments that exchange rate variability is costly and
dampens real economic activity.
To date, much of the analysis of the real effects of variable exchange rates has
considered whether variable exchange rates depress domestic exports and thereby worsen
international competitiveness. Empirical tests over both developed and developing country
export data have reached ambiguous conclusions.' Other recent discussions of the
additional costs of variable exchange rates center on the expense of irreversible
investment decisions, over-investment in productive capacity, and exchange-rate-induced
incentives for domestic producers to located their manufacturing facilities outside of the
United States.^ As in the literature on hysteresis in trade [Dixit (1989), Baldwin and
Krugman (1989)], an important issue is whether transitory movements of exchange rates
may lead to persistent restructuring if not deindustrialization of economies and whether
this restructuring is stimulated or reduced when fliture exchange rates are uncertain.
'Edison and Melvin (1990) provide a critical survey of this literature.
^Goldberg (199J) examines quarterly real investment activity in 31 sectors of United States industry and
finds that in the 1980s real exchange rate variability is correlated with reduced investment activity.
Campa and Goldberg (1993) conclude that the depressing effects of exchange rate volatility on United
States investment have varied over time in relation to sectoral reliance on e.xport markets and imported
inputs into production. These results are most significant for durable goods sectors.
In this paper we explore the implications of exchange rate variability for foreign
direct investment (FDI) flows. Our main theoretical result shows that if exchange rate
variability is to have a real impact on foreign direct investment, it will work in the
direction of increasing the share of production activity that is located offshore. For these
results, we consider the decisions made by risk-averse managers who are faced with both
revenue and cost uncertainty. Our theoretical propositions are tested using United States
bilateral FDI data for the 1978 to 1991 period. The empirical findings support the main
theoretical results.
The international investment implications of variable exchange rates, often stated in
policy discussions, have not been the subject of much formal analysis. The theoretical
work on this subject is divided among production flexibility arguments and risk aversion
arguments. The production flexibility arguments have been expounded most recently by
Aizenman (1992).^ Aizenman relies on a production structure whereby producers commit
to domestic and foreign capacity ex ante and commit to employment decisions ex post,
following the realization of some stochastic element such as nominal or real shocks. The
theoretical results are an open-economy extension of the earlier literature on domestic
investment, wherein the effects of price variability on investment hinge on the sunk costs
in capacity (i.e. the extent of investment irreversibilities), on the competitive structure of
the industry, and overall on the convexity of the profit ftinction in prices.'* In the
production flexibility arguments, the important presumption is that producers can adjust
their use of a variable factor following the realization of a stochastic input into profits.
•'in the international context, de Meza and van der Ploeg (1987) also have explored the "production-
flexibility motive" behind the plant location decisions of a multinational enterprise, arguing that the
structure of marginal-cost shocks and demand elasticities are key determinant of optimal investments in
domestic and foreign capacity.
"^The linkage between investment and price variability has been explored in a distinct domestically-
oriented literature. See Hartman (1972), Abel (1983), Craine (1989), Pindyck (1988) and Caballero
(1991).
Without this variable factor, i.e. under a productive structure with fixed instead of variable
factors, the potentially desirable effects on profits of price variability^ are diminished.
An alternative approach linking exchange-rate variability and investment relies on
risk aversion arguments. One treatment of this argument emphasizes that higher exchange-
rate variability lowers the certainty equivalent expected exchange-rate level. ^ These
certainty equivalent levels are used in the expected profit fianctions of firms that make
investment decisions today in order to realize profits in fiature periods. "^ Alternatively, one
could directly model the utility of expected profits as decreasing in their variability, as we
have done in Section 11.^
These production flexibility versus risk aversion approaches have merit under
different circumstances. The most important determinant is the time horizon between the
investment in capacity and the realization of the exchange rate shock. Specifically, when
considering whether exchange rate variability has real effects, a clear distinction must be
made between short term exchange rate volatility and longer term misalignments of
exchange rates. For sufficiently short horizons, ex ante commitments to capacity and to
related factor costs are a more realistic assumption than introducing a model based on ex
post variable factors of production.^ Hence, when considering the effects of short-term
exchange rate variability, risk aversion arguments are more convincing than production
flexibility arguments. For variability assessed over longer time horizons, the production
^This efifect is based on the strength of the Jensen's inequality argument leading to profit conve.xity in
variable prices.
6SeeCushman(1985, 1988).
^Another recent theoretical argument about the linkage between exchange-rate movements and
investment is based on the premise of imperfect capital markets [Froot and Stein (1991)]. In this setting.
exchange rate movements alter the relative wealth positions of competing international investors. By
contrast, the emphasis of our paper is on the foreign direct investment effects of forecast exchange rate
variability, instead of on contemporaneous exchange rate levels.
^See also Wolak and Kolstad (1991) who examine the covariance among different exchange rates in a
portfolio type analysis.
^Another explanation is that the technology is such that capacity is fully utilized.
flexibility motive provides a more compelling rationale for foreign direct investment flows
to be sensitive to variable exchange rates.
We are concerned in this paper with the implications of higher frequency exchange
rate variability than that appropriate for the production flexibility arguments. This higher
frequency exchange rate variability (for example, over weekly or monthly data) is the type
of movement that is typically considered in less rigorous discussions of the real effects of
exchange rate movements. Thus, our theoretical exposition relies more heavily on those
arguments based on aversion to the volatility of profits.
In Section II, using a two-period model of the inter-temporal decision-making of a
producer, we demonstrate how current assessments of future exchange-rate variability
determine the portion of future market demand to be satisfied by production facilities
situated in domestic versus foreign economies. Due to the emphasis of our model on short
run activity, we do not permit ex post adjustment of a variable productive factor:
producers cannot fire or hire workers the moment that they observe the realization of the
stochastic exchange rate or of demand. With labor contracts, most factors are quasi-fixed
in the production function.
If the parent company is risk neutral and if we assume that exchange rate
movements do not influence expected production costs, the parent company is indifferent
to the location of its manufacturing facilities. By contrast, if the parent has even a small
degree of risk aversion, the location of production facilities matters. The actual division of
capacity across borders depends on the distributions of both exchange rate and demand
shocks, and more generally, on whether the export market is more likely to experience
monetary or real shocks.
In Sections III and IV the theoretical propositions are examined empirically using
data on quarterly bilateral foreign direct investment flows between the United States and
the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. The estimation interval spans from 1978 through
1991. The effects on FDI of real exchange rate variability, real foreign demand shocks
and the correlation between exchange rates and demand shocks are tested. Our main
conclusion is consistent with the theory: exchange rate volatility does tend to increase the
share of productive capacity located abroad and therefore contributes to world-wide
economic integration. This contrasts with the view that volatile exchange rates impede
international activity. Section V summarizes, compares our findings with those of previous
studies, and concludes. '^
Finally, we would like to emphasize that it is not the objective of this paper to
survey or test the merits of alternative explanations for FDI flows. Our paper asks only
when and whether real exchange rate variability may influence the pattern of FDI activity.
This emphasis is meant to supplement and not meant to eclipse or diminish the range of
important motives for FDI exposited elsewhere. '• We focus purely on the effects of
expected volatility of exchange rates, without emphasizing the direct effects of exchange
rates on relative production costs and relative cross-country wealth patterns. ^^
IL THE MODEL
In our model, investment responds to exchange-rate variability in two ways. First,
producers can upscale or downscale existing production activities in the host country in
response to expected market conditions. Second, the multinationals can acquire or merge
with host-country producers. The latter category is the dominant form of recent foreign-
"^Existing empirical studies by Cushman (1985, 1988) on pooled United States bilateral FDI outflow data
for the 1963-1978 period and inflow data for the period 1963-1986 concluded that exchange rate
variability was positively correlated with both sets of flows. Bailey and Tavlas (1991), using quarterly
data on aggregate real direct investment inflows for 1976:1-1986:1, were unable to find any adverse
impact of either exchange rate variability or misalignment.
•'The "OLI triumvirate" [Ethier (1986)] is based on: i) ownership advantages, including patents or
management advantages held by the source country; ii) locational advantages, wherein the source or
destination country features motivate international investment; or iii) internalization advantages wherein
it is more advantageous for a firm to transact with its international subsidiary than to engage in arms
length market acUvities.
'^Relative wages are presented as incentives for FDI in the explanations based on "locational advantage"
Froot and Stein (1992) argue that wealth efiects of exchange rate changes may be the dominant channel
for exchange rate level effects. Klein and Rosengren (1992) find support for the wealth channel in annual
data for FDI flows into the United States.
direct investment activity in the United States. Mergers and acquisitions also subsume tlie
construction by parent companies of new "greenfield" facilities.
Uncertainty, introduced in our model through variable exchange rates and
stochastic foreign demand, influences total capacity choice and the share of total
production capacity located overseas. The distributions of the stochastic exchange rates
and foreign demand, including the correlations between these processes, are known to
producers. Producer/ investors may be either risk-neutral or risk-averse.
The Basic Set-up: Our basic model is a two-period one in which a domestic firm
produces only for a foreign market, with a combination of domestic capacity (with output
exported) and foreign capacity, sited with demand. In the first period, the horizontally-
integrated multinational decides on and commits to its capacity in its domestic and foreign
plant locations. This investment in capacity represents the parent company's planned sales.
The firm chooses productive capacity in both domestic and foreign locations either to
maximize the present discounted stream of expected profits or the utility of those profits.
In period two, uncertainty in exchange rates and in demand are resolved: domestic
and foreign facilities produce at capacity and take prices that clear the market. Investors
repatriate their profits. Even though capacity is chosen in the first period, payments for
investment capacity are made in the second period when revenues are realized.
Producers face an aggregate inverse demand fijnction in the foreign country,
denoted by P{q). In our fixed factor model q represents the total production capacity of
the multinational as well as (second-period) output since it will never pay to under-utilize
capacity. By making all factors of production fixed, we eliminate the ability of the
producers to buy, via foreign direct investment, the option of channeling production ex
post to the more profitable location. Domestic and foreign country variables are denoted
by d and /respectively. Thus, q^ and ^^ are domestic and foreign output. Let 6= q^-jq
define the fi^action of capacity overseas. Clearly < ^ < 1
.
Foreign demand is subject to random real shocks, denoted by J with E(S) = 0. In
our model, this corresponds to vertical movement in the foreign demand curve. Denote the
variance of 5 byo^. The real exchange rate, e, is defined in terms of domestic currency per
unit of foreign exchange, also is subject to random shocks. Thus, large e means a weak
domestic currency. We choose units so that the expected value of the real exchange rate is
unity, i.e. E(^)=l, and its variance is given by of. Thus, we would expect (and assume)
that cr^ < 1 since E{e) = 1 and e >0. The correlation coefficient between e and 5 is given
by p= Cov{e,S)/ cj^Og, where Cov{e,S)- E{e5) - e5.^^
Although a variety of factors can explain the sign of the correlation between
foreign demand and domestic real exchange rate shocks, consider the simple examples of
foreign monetary and productivity shocks. An increase in the money supply in the foreign
country would increase demand while raising foreign prices. With incomplete pass-
through of the price changes into the bilateral exchange rate, this leads to a short-term real
appreciation of the foreign currency and a real depreciation of the domestic currency.
Under this scenario, 5 increases (i.e. it is positive) while e also rises, implying a positive
value for p. Alternatively, if the foreign monetary shock leads to short-term exchange rate
overshooting, the domestic currency would appreciate in real terms and p would be
negative. Foreign demand shocks also can be caused by foreign productivity shocks
occurring outside of the sector in which our firm is operating. If the price index over
foreign goods is reduced without a compensating nominal exchange rate adjustment, the
domestic currency appreciates in real terms and a positive p value is observed. The
absolute size of these correlations could increase with wage rigidities.
Without loss of generality, we assume that capacity costs are equal to 1 per unit of
domestic output and equal to £?>iyper unit of output abroad, with w^ the foreign unit cost.
Thus, eM>i is interpreted as the ratio of foreign to domestic production costs. Since ours is
'^If the distribution of e is highly skewed, it would be possible for cT > 1 . We preclude this, without loss
of generality, in our opinion.
a short-term model, all production costs are embodied in the fixed factor, capacity. The
profit function of the producer in period 2 is:
7{q^,qj-,e,d) = e-[p(q) + 5)-q-q,-eWj-q^ (l)
For simplicity we treat the foreign wage uy as constant and the expected domestic-
currency value of the foreign wage as identically equal to the domestic wage, with both
equal to one. Assessed in period 1, the expected profits of the multinational, based on its
capacity choice across domestic and foreign markets, are:
E(7i) = q[p(q)-\ + T5)>0 (2)
where individual rationality requires expected profits to be nonnegative. Our first basic
result follows directly from (2):
Proposition 1: When exchange rate and foreign demand shocks are positively
(negatively) correlated, expected product price is less (more) than
expected marginal cost.
One interesting implication of this result is that expected product price may be less
than expected costs under profit-maximizing behavior and without dumping motives on
the part of the producer. Thus, the dominance of positively correlated exchange rates and
foreign demand shocks could lead to pricing behavior that is incorrectly interpreted as
arising fi-om dumping. Still unresolved fi-om Proposition 1 is the relationship between
these types of shocks and investment activities. For this point we consider two versions of
the model: one where the producer is risk-neutral and one where the producer is risk
averse. In both cases, the producer seeks to maximize expected profits (or the expected
utility of profits) by his choice of total capacity and the location of capacity across
countries.
II.1 Risk Neutrality
In the case of risk neutrality, the effect of altered aggregate production levels on
total expected profits is given by;
^ = p(q)^piq).ci-X^^5 (3)
dq
and the first-order conditions for profit maximization are given by:
P{q) + Piq)-q=\-yd (4)
The left-hand side of (4) represents expected marginal revenues whereas the right-
hand side terms represent (constant) marginal costs adjusted for the covariance between
exchange-rate shocks and foreign demand shocks for the multinational product. Our
second result follows from (4):
Proposition 2: If the domestic firm is risk neutral and expected production costs are
the same in domestic andforeign markets, then:
a) If p>0 ( p^ 0), marginal costs exceed (are less than) expected marginal
revenues and total output of the multinational expands (shrinks) relative to the
deterministic case.
b) Thefirm is indifferent regarding the location ofproductionfacilities;
Proposition 2 emphasizes that in this simple two-period model with risk neutrality,
the multinational's investment in capacity today is a function of the correlation between the
exchange rate used to value export earnings and the foreign demand for the multinational's
product. Under risk neutrality, the total volume of production may be sensitive to the size
and correlations between shocks, but the location of production facilities is not sensitive.
The current model generates optimal production or capacity investment levels, but the
parent company remains indifferent to the choice of home or domestic markets for
location of the production facilities. The important point to keep in mind is that the
stochastic nature of exchange rates and demand matter in our model only to the extent that
these shocks are correlated. Without risk aversion, and without expected relative wage or
marginal cost effects across countries, foreign direct investment flows will not be
significantly influenced by altered variability of exchange rates.
The correlation between export demand shocks and real exchange rate shocks is
important in Proposition 2 and, in general, will be shown to be an important theoretical
determinant of the location of investment facilities under risk aversion.
II.2 Risk Averse Producer-Investors
Suppose that producers are risk-averse.''* Assume that the expected utility of profits
can be written as a function of expected profits and the variance of profits.
E{U{K)) = u{E{7T\Var{K)) (5)
This expected utility specification is justified if utility is quadratic or if the uncertainty
induced in profits is normally distributed [Jarrow, 1988]. We will assume (e,5) are
bivariate normal.'^ We also assume that E{U{k)) is strictly concave, a somewhat stronger
assumption. The variance of profits is given by:'^
Var(K) = E[p{q)q(e-\) + [ed-7d)q + q^[\-e))' =q-E[[p{q)-e)[e-\)+[ed-Td)f {6)
Using the properties of stochastic exchange rates and demand, this yields
'"'It often is argued that firms are not risk averse. Dufey and Srinivasula (1984) review the weaknesses of
these common arguments. First, risk aversion arises if corporate management seeks to avoid default risk
and the costs of financial distress, where these costs rise with the variability of the net cash flows of the
firm. Moreover, managers (and shareholders) may be personally heavily e.xposed to the risk of variable
firm profits and thereby would attempt to eliminate this risk. Rodriguez (1981) provides supporting
evidence on management attitudes and behavior. Another common argument against firm risk aversion is
based on the Modigliani-Miller theorem. This theorem implies that whatever the firm can do (in terms of
hedge activities), investors can do: if exchange risk is to be hedged, it need not be done by the firm. But.
this argument is weakened by higher impediments to efficient hedging by individuals, including firm-level
access to lower cost hedges and informational asymmetries across managers and shareholders about firm-
level exposure to risk.
^^Note that we stated earlier that E(e)=l and e is non-negative. The exchange rate process is assumed to
be centered about one rather than about zero. Because of normality, we have:
E(e5) = pa^(Tg, E(e'S) = Ipa^G^, and E[e-5~)- 2p-(r^cr^ + {\ + crJo^^.
'^Equation (6) is derived by taking the expected value of the squared difference between profits as defined
in equaUon (1) and expected profits as presented in equation (2).
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where 0=q^/q.
Using equations (5), (2) and (7), one can determine the period one investments in
domestic and foreign capacity (actually q and 9) that will maximize investor utility. The
goal, maximizing (5) subject to ^>0, 0<^<1 and (2), represents a constrained
optimization problem for which the Lagrangian is:
L = E{u{7r)) + Aq+ve+ju{^-0) + x(P(q)-'^ + ^) (8)
where A., v, fi, and x are the multipliers on the respective constraints. Consider the case
where (2) is non-binding and thus x^O. The first-order conditions depend on whether
optimal q and/or 9, denoted by "*", are at the boundaries:
q*>0, 0^ = o —^—^^ = 0, —^ <0 (9b)
^ dO
q*>0, 0^ = \ <» —^-^^ = 0, —^ ^ >0 (9c)
q* = <z> —^ ^ ' <0 (9d)
where the basic regularity condition (strict complementarity) is assumed to apply.
Assume y - -lU^jU^ > is constant where U is defined in (5) and the U, denote
the respective first derivatives. Then, in (9), note that
-^-—L = U,-^ + U,—-^^U,{A-Piq)B) (10a)
Oji aq aj
11
where
A = P(q) + Piq)q-\ + '^-^Var(7r) (lOc)
B=rqi{P{q)-0)o:+^s) (lOd)
From the assumed strict concavity of E(U{7r)), a solution to (9) and (10) exists,
although of course it may be trivial (^0). Note that these first-order conditions differ
primarily in the A term in equation (lOa). Therefore, the following results hold:
Lemma 1: Assuming regularity conditions hold and equation (2) holds but is non-
binding, for any optimal q thefollowing applies:
P{q)-e+p^{
CJ.
= 0<:>q,,q^>0
<0<=>^^=0 (11)
> o ^^ =
The basic interpretation of this result is that, with even a small degree of risk
aversion, the parent company is not indifferent to the location of facilities, even when the
expected unit costs of production are equal across facilities. Foreign direct investment
flows will be influenced by the expected variability of real exchange rates.
It is important to remember that p,<J^, and a^ are exogenous to the firm. Based on
these characteristics of the distributions of the e's and (5's, the firm chooses q^ and q^
(both of which may be zero). Lemma 1 leads directly to the following corollary:
Corollary I: Under the conditions ofLemma J with q> 0, the following must hold:
where/4 = -p-^(l-a^)
Proof Add equation (11) and equation (2) to derive equation (12).
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There are a number of implications of Corollary 1 . First, with e and 5 positively
correlated, foreign demand is high precisely when the domestic currency is weak. By
locating production facilities overseas, the producer minimizes the variance of expected
profits and increases expected utility. Thus, the expected utility of profits is maximized by
locating all production in the foreign country.
Second, when there is only exchange rate uncertainty and no demand uncertainty (or
when these shocks are orthogonal), then it is always desirable to locate some production
overseas, i.e. gf>0. This may be the case if exchange rates are determined purely by
short-term speculation in financial markets and are unrelated to other market
fiandamentals. Under risk aversion, there always will be production located abroad, in
contrast to the risk neutrality case where the location choice is indeterminate.
Third, if demand and exchange rate shocks are modestly negatively correlated it will
be desirable to have some domestic production and not place all of one's capacity offshore.
Corollary 1 also states that when specific patterns in domestic and foreign
investment activity are observed, there are relationships between exchange rate and
foreign demand shocks that must be satisfied. For example, if no capacity is located
offshore, exchange rates and foreign demand shocks must be negatively correlated If
there is at least some capacity sourced at home, then these shocks must be positively
correlated.
n.3 Comparative Statics:
Having defined the condition for optimal choice of q^ and q^ , we now turn to the
question of how these optimal choices are affected by the scale of the uncertainty in
exchange rates and demand and by the covariance structure between these shocks.
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Proposition 3: Assume at an optimal q, that qj,qf> 0. Then.
|^>0 f <0 (.3)
e e
Proof: See Appendix.
This result states that the greater the variability of exchange rates, the larger the
share of capacity located offshore, even though overall capacity declines. We cannot
conclude whether or not the absolute level of FDI rises or falls. Implicit in this proposition
is the fact that exchange rate and demand shocks are negatively correlated (Corollary 1 );
otherwise q^ = . This is somewhat as expected since profits, as opposed to just revenues,
are exposed to exchange rate fluctuations when foreign investment occurs.
Further comparative statics results emerge with some restrictions on the form of
the demand function:
Proposition 4: Assume at an optimal q, that qj,qf>0. Further assume that demand is
not excessively convex, i.e. F (q) + P"{q)q <0 for all q>0. Then.
—
->0 (14)
dp
Proof: See Appendix.
By assumption p<Q from Corollary 1 . A negative p means that foreign demand is
high (5 is large) precisely when the domestic currency is strong. But, as this relationship
erodes as p becomes larger and we move closer to the region of p > where all
production is foreign. Thus, as p rises, rises. When < ^< 1, an increase in exchange
rate variability which would otherwise tend to increase the share of foreign investment can
be offset by an increase in the absolute value of the covariance between demand shocks
and exchange rate shocks.
14
II.4 Testable Implications
Our model of the implications of real exchange rate variability yields clear
predictions for bilateral flows of foreign direct investment under fixed productive factors.
Under risk neutrality, FDI share is not expected to be correlated with variability measures.
By contrast, with just a small degree of risk aversion and if p > : positive FDI always
occurs (Corollary 1). This share of total capacity located abroad would be unresponsive to
exchange rate variability in this regime only if all capacity already is located on foreign
soil. With the share ofFDI in total investment bounded away from zero and one and p< 0,
the FDI share increases as exchange rate variability rises (Proposition 2). Furthermore, as
long as demand is not excessively convex, the FDI share increases as the correlation
between exchange rate and real demand shocks rises (Proposition 3).
Defining a source country by the index / and a destination market by the index y,
these theoretical propositions give rise to the following testing equation:
O'l =/?; +y5;<, + P\cyi,+ p\p'l ^-p\e-l +f3\yi +//; (15)
where the share of production capacity from the source country / located in the destination
country7 is a fiinction of (i) the volatility of the bilateral real exchange rate, a^^, which is
expected to enter with a positive coefficient P\}^ (ii) the volatility of real destination
market demand, cr^,, for which the coefficient p\ is ambiguously signed; (iii) the
correlation between the real exchange rate and real destination market demand, /?'/ , which
is expected to enter with a positive coefficient P[, and (iv) the real exchange rate e'j
,
which is expected to enter with a negative coefficient P^^. We also include in the
regressions (v) destination market demand, gdpl , although the sign and significance is not
determined in our model.
'^Assuming some risk aversion.
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in. The Data
These theoretical predictions are tested using bilateral foreign direct investment
activity between the United States and the United Kingdom, Japan and Canada. The
country choices for bilateral partners is partially motivated by data availability and partially
motivated by the importance of these countries to the United States in foreign-direct-
investment flows. In 1990, for example, the United Kingdom, Japan and Canada together
accounted for approximately 55 percent of all FDI into the United States, both when
measured in terms of parent company identities or in terms of ultimate beneficial owners.
Our model treats foreign-direct-investment as total investment or capacity location
choice by the parent in a subsidiary at any point in time. We use flow data on bilateral
investments, with the foreign direct investment data drawn from United States balance-of-
payments tables. For inflows into the United States, these data capture the increase in the
book value of equity in United States businesses or assets deemed under foreign control.
An analogous definition applies to outflows originating in the United States and invested
abroad. •^ In order to minimize estimation problems stemming from the major step-up in
the early 1970s of interest in the United States as a target for foreign investment [Caves
(1989)] our sample period begins in 1978. The data is quarterly, from 1978:1 through
1991 :IV. All data sources are provided in Table 1.
'^These balance-of-payments data are subject to a well-knovm short-coming: reinvested earnings of
foreign subsidiaries, as invested wealth by the parent, are not appropriately measured. This omission is
more of a problem in the late 1970s than it is in the 1980s, when reinvested earnings were a much smaller
portion of bilateral equity positions [Lipsey (1992)].
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Table 1: Data Sources
Foreign Direct Investment Series
q'^
: Bilateral foreign direct investment flows between the United States and Canada,
Japan, and the United Kingdom. Source: The Survey of Current Business.
Country Investment Series
q^ : Aggregate investment by each country / are non-seasonally adjusted data.
United States: Non-Residential Fixed Investment, source: the National Income and
Product Accounts. ^^
Japan: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, source: Economic Planning Agency (of Japan).
United Kingdom: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, source: Central Statistical Office, data
reported in Economic Trends 1992 Supplement
Canada: Gross Fixed Capital Formation.
Bilateral Exchange Rates
Each bilateral real exchange rate is defined as the product of the source country nominal
bilateral exchange rate multiplied by the destination country price index and divided by the
source country price index. The nominal exchange-rate data are from the International
Financial Statistics (IMF) and the price indices are CPI data drawn from the OECD.
Real GDP
Nominal GDP for each country i, deflated by the respective CPI series, with data drawn
from the International Financial Statistics (IMF) and the OECD, respectively.
a: The quarterly data are from "United States International Transactions Tables", by the United States
Department of Commerce. The series are "Private Foreign Direct Investment into the United States" and
"United States Direct Investment, Private Assets Abroad".
b: We have also conducted all of the regression analysis using a denominator of domestic investment
net of total net foreign direct investment inflows, in order to adjust for the foreign source investment
included in the total domestic investment measures. None of our results are significantly altered by this
adjustment, so we report only the results using total investment in the denominator.
Construction ofFDI Shares The shares ^are constructed by dividing the FDI outflows
from a source country to a destination market by a measure of investment activity in the
source country. The two-way bilateral flows are between the United States and Canada,
Japan, and the United Kingdom. While this measure captures the flavor of our model,
there are limitations in this data. The theory considers movements in FDI relative to
domestic investment. However, for these purposes the appropriate measure of domestic
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investment is not aggregate source country investment but instead is investment in the
total new capacity of export-oriented production firms. Unfortunately this measure is
unavailable. The second shortcoming of our data is that the foreign direct investment data
miss important forms of reinvestment of earnings and tend to understate total foreign
investment.
Construction of volatility and correlation measures: For each of the bilateral real
exchange rates e'^ used, both the levels and distributions of each real exchange rate are
constructed from the vantage point of the respective source countries. The measure of
exchange rate volatility is constructed as the standard deviation of the exchange rate over
an interval, normalized by the mean level of the exchange rate within the interval. We
construct this measure over rolling samples of twelve quarters of data, prior to and
inclusive of each period t. This measure a'^ incorporates both the "predictable" and
"unpredictable" components of exchange rate movements. It is particularly informative
when exchange rates are close to random walks.
An analogous procedures also is used to construct a proxy for real demand
variability for each destination country, cr'^j. In addition, the real exchange rate and real
GDP series (about their respective sample means) are correlated across rolling samples of
data. The resulting correlation between these residual series is reported at each time t and
is denoted by p'^ . The descriptive statistics for each of the volatility and correlation
measures are presented in Table 2.
The US$/Can$ real exchange rates exhibited the smallest amount of variability, at
roughly one third the size of the dollar/yen and dollar/pound levels. The variability of the
dollar/yen exchange rates increased significantly in the 1985 to 1990 period as compared
with levels in 1978 to 1984. Negative correlations between exchange rates and foreign real
GDP generally are observed from the Japanese perspective for its assessment of the
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United States as a destination country for investments and for Japanese products.'^ Such
negative correlations also are observed from the perspectives of the United Kingdom and
Canada in assessing flows to the United States in the second half of the 1980s. The United
States flows to Canada were primarily under a regime of negative correlations in the late
1970s and early 1980s. This could suggest that monetary shocks in the United States
markets or possibly fiscal shocks in foreign markets were dominant during this period.
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics on Variance and Covariance Measures
(period averages)
normalized std.
dev. of real
exchange rate
78-84 85-91
correlation: real
exchange rate and
destination market
GDP shocks
78-84 85-91
normalized std.
dev. of real
destination market
GDP
78-84 85-91
destination market
country
yen/US$ real
exchange rate
0.094 0.111 -0.397 -0.396
(89.3%) (85.7%)
0.038 0.037 United States
poundAJSS real
exchange rate
0.098 0.093 0.107 -0.311
(42.9%) (82.1%)
— United States
Can$/US$ real
exchange rate
0.029 0.035 0.109 -0.123
(46.4%) (67.9%)
— United States
US$/yen real
exchange rate
0.097 0.109 0.025 0.144
(53.6%) (42.9%)
0.081 0.079 Japan
US$/pound real
exchange rate
0.098 0.089 0.145 0.237
(28.6%) (42.9%)
0.035 0.042 United Kingdom
US$/Can$ real
exchange rate
0.030 0.035 -0.335 0.199
(96.4%) (46.4%)
0.051 0.046 Canada
numbers in parentheses reflect, respectively, the share of p < out of a total of 28 observations in the
1978 to 1984 sample and 24 observations in the 1985 to 1991 sample.
Stationarity Properties of the Data. In Table 3 we provide the p-values of augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests performed over the data used in the empirical work. We can
reject non-stationarity for all ratios constructed for FDI activity with the exception of the
shares of United States investment into Japan and into the United Kingdom.
•'This is interesting when considered in the context of Proposition 1. Recall that one interpretation of
Proposition 1 is that the existence of positive correlations between exchange rates and foreign demand
shocks may inappropriately lead to dumping charges. Since the Japanese observe negative correlations,
our model does not suggest that evidence provided in support of dumping charges would be misconstmed.
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Table 3 p-values from Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for Unit Roots.
Tests performed using constant & no trend (c). constant and trend (t), neither constant or
trend (n), and with range of lag lengths. UR = Unit Root
description
United States
[#obs.=52]
Canada
[#obs.=52]
Japan
[#obs.=521
United
Kingdom
[#obs.=52]
FDI share of
US into
destination
n.a.
Ic: p=5
Reject UR
Ic: p=l
Reject UR
4c:p=5
Reject UR
FDI of source
into US as
source share
n.a. 5c: p=5
Reject UR
3t: p>10
Cannot Reject
4c:p>10
Cannot Reject
P(ij) US$/
destination n.a.
4t:p>10
Cannot Reject
4n:p==5
Reject UR
4n:p=l
Reject UR
P (i.j) destination/
US$ n.a.
4n:p=l
Reject UR
4n: p=10
Reject UR
6t: p>10
Cannot Reject
^e(»-J) us$/
destination n.a.
Ic: p=l
Reject UR
lc:p=l
Reject UR
3c:p>10
Cannot Reject
<^e(iO) destination/
US$ n.a.
Ic: p=l
Reject UR
lc:p=l
Reject UR
3c:p>10
Cannot Reject
real GDP
volatility
4c: p=5
Reject UR
4t: p==5
Reject UR
4c:p>10
Cannot Reject
5c: p>10
Cannot Reject
real exchange
rate
us$/
destination
n.a. 3c: p>10
Cannot Reject
Ic: p>10
Cannot Reject
6c: p>10
Cannot Reject
real exchange
rate
destination/
US$
n.a. 3c: p>10
Cannot Reject
lc:p>10
Cannot Reject
6c: p>10
Cannot Reject
real GDP 5t: p>10
Cannot Reject
6t: p>10
Cannot Reject
4t: p>10
Cannot Reject
4t:p>10
Cannot Reject
The p-values reported correspond to the highest probability of a unit root over the range of tests
performed using the constant and trend, constant and no trend, and neither constant or trend, and at
various lag lengths. In this wav, we have a conservative assessment of unit root rejections.
With the possible exception of the exchange rate and GDP series, we do not have
unit root problems for the right hand side (RHS) variables included in regressions for
bilateral outflows from the United States or inflows into the United States from Canada.
However, inflows into the United States from Japan and from the United Kingdom may be
nonstationary series. ^o While this is important since regression inference is severely
weakened if stationary series are regressed against nonstationary series, caution must be
exercised in any event because the test for nonstationary are biased in against rejecting
unit roots. Thus, we account for the possibility the ADF tests yield incorrect results by
following regression procedures suggested by Stock (1992): those right hand side
2°The ADF test is being applied to small samples, generally 52 observations, and, as shown by Stock
(1992) is biased against rejection of unit roots in the data.
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variables that may have unit roots are entered both in level and first difference format into
the regressions. Those dependent variables that may have unit roots are tested
alternatively in level and first difference format.
rv, RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The implications of exchange rate and demand patterns for the share of investment
activity located overseas are studied via estimates of regression equation (15). 2' For each
of the directions of bilateral investment, we also tested whether the FDI shares responded
differentially to the volatility measures across regions of positive and negative value of p.
If there was a differential response, the regression results are reported. 22
As shown in Table 4, exchange rate variability had a positive and statistically
significant effect on four of the six series of bilateral FDI shares: real exchange rate
variability increased the share of total United States investment capacity located in Canada
and in Japan, and increased the share of Canadian and United Kingdom investment located
in the United States. These results are consistent with the predictions of Proposition 3. We
did not find evidence that the effects of real exchange rate volatility on investment
significantly differed across periods when there were positive and negative correlations
between exchange rate and demand shocks. Of the two series on bilateral FDI shares in
2
'The ordinary least squares regressions contain seasonal dummy variables and serial correlation
adjustments. The coefficients on autoregressive and seasonal terms are not reported in the summary tables
but are available from the authors upon request. Where appropriate, heteroskedasticity and serieal
correlation problems are corrected using Newey-West procedures. The models were chosen based upon the
Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation, various versions of White's test for heteroscedasticity. and an
ARCH test of four lags. If the models passed all of these tests, their inference is accepted. If not. the
models were estimated where appropriate by a GMM procedure with a Newey-West correction for serial
correlation. As required, the regression equation is modified as required to account for nonstationarities
in the data by also entering the potentially first order integrated series into the regressions in first
differences.
22We do not control our results for changes in tax laws: such laws have not been found to be significant
determinants of real bilateral FDI flows of the United States. One could consider, for e.xample, the
implications of the 1981 US tax cut. which provided for accelerated depreciation. This policy change
remained in place through the end of 1986. Another important US tax policy change is the Repeal of the
General Utilities Rule in 1987. Slemrod (1989) did not find these tax changes were significant for US
inward bilateral FDI flows. Klein and Rosengren (1992) had consistent findings, and these tax changes
did not alter the pattern of exchange rate level effects on bilateral investments.
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which exchange rate volatility was not statistically significant, the regression equations
were subject to econometric problems. The series of Japanese FDI shares into the United
States is potentially nonstationary and first differences of this dependent variable were
used in the regressions. The share regression for United States FDI into the United
Kingdom was subject to problems of heteroskedasticity: the reported corrections using
Newey-West procedures eliminated any observed statistical significant over the right-hand
side variables.
Our theoretical work did not imply clear predictions about the effect of variability
of destination market demand conditions on FDI shares. This force was statistically
significant only for Japanese investment into the United States: the higher was United
States real GDP volatility, the smaller was the share of Japanese investment sited in the
United States.
Proposition 4 stated that, under particular restrictions about the structure of
demand, an increase in the covariance between destination market demand shocks and real
exchange rate shocks would lead to an increase in the FDI share. This direction of
response is supported for all outflows of FDI from the United States and for Canadian
FDI into the United States. However, the results were statistically distinct fi'om zero only
for two of the six bilateral flow shares.
Exchange rate levels and first differences in exchange rates also enter into the
regression equations. These variables have been found to be highly significant in previous
empirical studies of real FDI activity tested over annual data. By most theoretical
arguments, a domestic currency depreciation is expected to decrease source country
foreign direct investments abroad. The basic arguments fall into two camps: either real
depreciations raise the relative price of foreign productive resources or increase the
relative competitiveness of foreign competitors bidding for the same production site. It
should be noted that these arguments apply to levels of FDI activity and require additional
assumptions before they also pertain to the share data as used in our regressions.
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Table 4: FDI Outflows as a Share of Source Country Investment
&I =pi +/?;<,-, +P'2<-^ +p.p'L +M'i, ^P'^yu +/^;
RHS Direction of Bilateral FDI as Share of Source Country Investment
variables
Can. FDI U.S. FDI UK FDI US FDI Japan FDI US FDI
into the US into into the into the into the into Japan
ae
Canada United States^^ UK+ United States^^
1.58* .225^=^ 1.525* -.354 -.027 .012 .037**
(.586) (.114) (.440) (.378) (.022) (.039) (.021)
D*ae -.567
(.932)
-.021
(.020)
Aae 0.637
(1.24)
-.492
(.962)
-.164
(.266)
-.114*
(.040)
D*Aae —"" -.198
(.497)
^5 .851 .394 -0.454 .819 -.270* .161 .091
(1.07) (.396) (.860) (.766) (.050) (.334) (.097)
A05_ -1.140 -.937 -.687 .027 .131
(2.61) (3.82) (.516) (.197) (.273)
p
.072* .008 -0.005 -.012 .012 -.003 -8E-4 .001
(.030) (.010) (.020) (.021) (.020) (.009) (.005) (.005)
D*p -.128**
(.065)
.033
(.046)
.013**
(.008)
A.p -0.055
(.044)
-.229*
(.090)
D*A.p .401*
(.138)
e -.077 -2E-4 -0.094 -.023 -6E-6 -2.99*
(.239) (.070) (.113) (.024) (8E-5) (1.44)
t^e .551** -.128 0.413 -.082 .009 7.6E-5 5E-5 3.00**
(.298) (.117) (.286) (.241) (.020) (8.5E-5) (9E-5) (1.73)
y 3E-4 -2E-4 0.001* -.002 8E-5* 2E-7*
(9E-3) (4E-4)
2E-3
(.000) (.001) (2.5E-5) (7E-8)
aV 5E-4 1.8E-3 1.5E-3 .001 6E-5 5E-5 9E-8
(4E-3) (9E-4) (.002) (1.2E-3) (.001) (lE-4) (15E-5) (8E-7)
Adj. R2 .176 .068 .267 .322 -.062 .636 .272 .337
D.W. 2.17 2.04 2.09 2.29 1.94 1.99 2.14 2.04
F-statistic 1.64 1.26 2.03 2.24 6.25 2.64 2.40
^observation 43 47 46 43 48 46 45 45
a/ first differe-nee of the dependent variable.
Standard errors reported below parameter estimates. "D" indiesites a dummy variable for periods
with p > 0. A indicates the first difference of a variable.
Constants, se.isonal dummy variables and AR and MA adjustments are not reported.
denotes sigjiificance at the 5% level; denotes significance at the 10% level.
"^ indicates tl lat the Newey West procedure was applied.
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In our tests using quarterly data, the exchange rate levels entered with the
expected sign in all regressions: exchange rate depreciations of the source country
currency lead to a reduction in investment flow shares to foreign markets. However, these
effects generally were neither large or statistically significant. In part, the weak role of
exchange rate levels may be attributable to the potential nonstationarity of quarterly
exchange rate series. It also may be attributable to a valuation effect: although the absolute
level of FDI may decline in response to a domestic currency depreciation, the domestic
currency value of that FDI at least partially increases due to the change in the exchange
rate. Our findings are consistent with Lipsey's (1992) interpretation of the potential effects
of exchange rate changes on investment. Lipsey argues that a depreciation of the domestic
currency does make foreign facilities more expensive, and probably leads to a reduction in
demand for physical investment abroad. However the overall impact on the value of
foreign direct investment requires a high elasticity of demand for investment assets. Our
results suggest that either the quarterly movements in exchange rate do not matter for FDI
flows, or the elasticities of investment demand are not large enough so that domestic
currency depreciations actually reduce investment flows abroad.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has contributed to our understanding of the real effects of variable
exchange rates in several dimensions. First, we have argued that there are two classes of
models that link real exchange rate variability to international investment activity. The
first class of model relies on the argument that producers engage in international
investment diversification in order to achieve ex post production flexibility and higher
profits in response to shocks. This argument is relevant to the extent that ex post
production flexibility is possible within the window of time before the realization of the
shocks. This suggests that the production flexibility argument is less likely to pertain to
short term volatility in exchange rates than to realignments over longer intervals.
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Since many of the discussions of the merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rate
regimes emphasize the implications of short term volatility, the group of arguments based
on the risk-taking characteristics of producers are more likely to be most relevant for
investment activity in domestic and foreign markets. We use a simple model to illustrate
the linkage between exchange rate variability and the decision by producers to locate
production facilities on domestic versus foreign shores. Exchange rate variability is
expected to have real effects on the share of domestic investment resources channeled
abroad in a limited set of circumstances. If investors are risk neutral, the model does not
predict any statistical relationship between exchange rate volatility and the allocation of
production facilities between domestic and foreign markets. But, if there is risk aversion
among producers, exchange rate volatility may expand the share of investment resources
located offshore.
We used data for two-way bilateral foreign direct investment flows between the
United States, and Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom to explore the empirical
content of the theoretical propositions. The empirical results were consistent with the
theory: exchange rate volatility tended to stimulate the share of investment activity located
on foreign soil. We did not find evidence that there were statistically different effects of
exchange rate volatility on investment shares when one distinguishes between periods
where real or monetary shocks dominate exchange rate activity. We also found that real
depreciations of the source country currency were associated with reduced investment
shares to foreign markets, but these results generally were statistically insignificant in our
quarterly data.
The theoretical work concluded that even though the share of total investment
located abroad will, under certain conditions, rise as exchange rate volatility increases.
But, this does not necessarily imply that exchange rate volatility depresses aggregate
investment activity in the domestic economy. In order to conclude that domestic aggregate
investment declines, one must show that the increase in domestic outflows is not offset by
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a rise in foreign inflows. In the aggregate United States economy, it is unlikely that
exchange rate volatility has had large contractionary effects on overall investment. This is
substantiated by the findings of Campa and Goldberg (1993), in which exchange rate
volatility did not significantly influence investment in United States manufacturing
nondurables sectors. ^^ Although exchange rate volatility did tend to depress investment in
manufacturing durables sectors, these effects were quantitatively quite small. Taken
together, these studies suggest that exchange rate volatility can contribute to the
internationalization of production activity without substantially depressing economic
activity in the home market. This conclusion is important for arguments about the
appropriate choice of exchange rate regime: it is incorrect to assume that the selection of a
flexible exchange rate system will lead to depressed economic activity. If the lessons
drawn from United States investment flows can generalize, the results suggest that the
choice of a controlled exchange rate regime does not clearly provide an environment more
conducive to economic growth. Even if other empirical studies conclude that exchange
rate volatility depresses real export activity, this does not contradict our conclusions.
Exchange rate volatility can spur an increase in international capital flows that can
substitute for international trade in goods without depressing overall economic activity.
"See also Goldberg (1993).
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Appendix I
Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove this proposition we totally differentiate the first-order condition (9a) to obtain:
\dq] ^EU'
dx
de
-
dq3x
ldx\
.
deac.
d'EU ^EU
ai' aide
^EU ^EU
dOdq d&- JLt^j L avox. } ^^.,n
where EU-E\lJ^7i)\ and x can be /?, cr^, or cr^. Cramer's rule is applied to determine
d6ldx.2Sidi dqjdic . We know that the left-hand side matrix of (A-l) is negative semi-
definite, and thus its determinant is positive, since El] is strictly concave by assumption.
Since at an optimum A=B=0 (from eq. lOa and lOb), and eliminating the minus sign of the
right-hand-side vector, the following holds
.
de
sign— = -sign
dx
and sign— - -sign
dx
^A-FB) ^A-FB)
ai ac
dB
ac
-
-sign
' dA^aB__dAdB_
^a] ac a ajj
=
-sign{A)
ee a ee a
Note that
^
= 2F(^) + P"(^)<7-ra:[l + a;(lV)]<0
^-rq'F{qW^<^
aj
dA ^
de ^^ '
de ^^ '
p{q)-e+p^ =
dA
a
a
a^as+2qrpol(\-cj:) , x = p
pa,-2qr(J,(rs{\+p')<0 , x = cT^
pc7^-2qrc7s{\ + o:(\+p'))<0 ,x = a,
N^^e^S>^ > x = P
yq^p(j^<0
,
x = cjs
(A-2a)
(A-2b)
(A-3a)
(A-3b)
(A-3c)
(A-3d)
(A-4 a.b.c)
(A-4 cl,e,f)
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The sign of (A-4a) is indeterminate; the sign of the other equations in A-4 follow from
Corollary 1 (i.e /?< 0), Lemma 1, and the assumptions of the proposition. Only dOldx for
x= <j^ can be definitively signed.
Proof of Proposition 3 :
Using the above notation it is easy to demonstrate that — > and Al „ < 0. Since
dp ^
d^
p<0, this implies A < which implies > 0.
dp
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